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Abstract
This article reports on a decision model that highlights a reward-based promotional
strategy for a bus organization to maintain its market. The market control law
is obtained from an optimal solution in the system equations on the basis of the
relationship among the transit operator, ticket agent, and government. The article
presents a case study for the Taipei bus transit system. Results in this research confirm the effectiveness of the proposed strategy for bus operators as well as for traffic
improvement. The proposed model reveals the optimal actions for the agent and bus
operators under governmental policy.

Introduction
Public transit ridership in many urban areas is declining. Passenger cars are preferred for travel, subsequently inducing traffic congestion. Although transportation authorities have implemented several encouraging policies, such as tax deductions and exclusive bus system operations, passengers lack interest in traveling by
bus because such transportation policies do not directly benefit the customers. In
addition, the elasticity of the price of public transportation is extremely low (Lago,
Mayworm, and Mcenroe 1981), with an average range of -0.28 ± 0.16. Such inelastic circumstances imply that reducing the fare price leads to a net loss in revenues.
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Indeed, almost all countries have a regulated pricing scheme for public transportation. Applying various pricing strategies to affect transportation markets directly
conflicts with such regulations. Therefore, a stimulatory strategy is expected to
ensure the survival of bus operators and increase public transit system use.
This study presents a novel incentive system to exert control on the transportation market. The proposed system focuses on selling prepaid tickets merged with
a lottery to satisfy the operator’s expectations, particularly in terms of ridership
or revenue. A case study is conducted to verify that such a strategy yields a satisfactory solution for bus operators while also alleviating traffic congestion. As a
concrete measure in the proposed strategy, the government is to apply a subsidy
policy for bus operators when total passenger loads reach a certain threshold
within a specific period. Bus operators can also encourage their ticketing agent
to promote the use of prepaid tickets by offering a bonus to the agent when the
amount of ticket sales achieves a certain quantity. The agent is also offered several reward grades measured in purchased tickets or mileage for passengers. This
incentive strategy subsequently stimulates the market.
Control theory is the basic methodology in the analysis of marketing relationships
within the proposed promotional system. The upper level of the strategic goal
is to alleviate traffic congestion by encouraging individuals to travel by bus. The
primary level is to maximize profits for the ticketing agent and the bus operational
organization. The proposed model is constructed with the agent’s and the bus
operators’ profits, respectively, in terms of time. The solution identifies the sensitivity and optimality of the control variables.

Premises for Modeling
Incentive System Structure
Figure 1 depicts the relationships among the ticketing agent, bus operators, and
the government in the incentive system. According to these relationships, the
ticket sales agent attempts to obtain maximum profit through a promotional
strategy for selling a sufficient quantity of tickets. The agent’s profit includes the
net revenue from selling tickets and a bonus obtained from the bus operators.
The bus operators’ profit comes from carrying more passengers and possibly
from a government subsidy. To obtain the subsidy, the operator must meet a
performance threshold of total passengers carried within a period, T. If more
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Figure 1. Relations among Sales Agent, Bus Operators, and Government

people travel by bus, traffic congestion is reduced and the quality of life in the city
improves. Passengers expect to win an incentive prize from the ticketing agent.
Passenger Incentive Types
Promotional design of the prepaid tickets should be as attractive as possible. To
extend the bus transportation market, noncaptive passengers are the targets of
the promotional program. According to one survey (Jiang 1998), a lottery is one
of the most attractive activities for noncaptive passengers. In this study, a lottery
game is designed for the purpose indicated. In the game, both instant and delayed
rewards are considered. The quicker an individual purchases a prepaid ticket card
the higher the probability of winning an instant reward. After spending the prepaid value of the ticket, the individual has the opportunity to win a grand prize.
This strategy encourages individuals not only to purchase prepaid tickets, but also
to travel by bus. The structure of the prize layout was arranged as a pyramid with
multiple layers and items. The grand prize is generally awarded at the end of a
given period, denoted as T.
Passenger Demand Function
During this analysis the passenger demand function is formulated first. Based on
the formulated demand function, profits for the ticketing agent and bus operators
can then be estimated. Demand is affected by fare and level of transport services
such as route, frequency, vehicle-quality (seat, air-conditioned), driver behaviors,
and so forth. All routes are assumed to have already been allocated and cannot
be changed; the number of existing vehicles is sufficient for any frequency extension (i.e., bus transport capability is far from exhausted and in a depressed period);
vehicles are all in the range of usage; and employed drivers are experienced. All
people know the fare, route network, schedules, and traffic conditions. The analytical change in price, even through a lottery activity, is relatively small compared
to the basic transportation price from the regulated fare. Under these conditions,
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the two factors of ticket price and incentive prize are sufficient to determine the
demand variation for most road users. Thus, the demand function is assumed to
be linear (McConnell and Brue 1993) in terms of the price and the expectation of
winning a prize in the incentives:
q(t)=ap(t)+bE(M)+c

(1)

where:
q(t) 		

denotes the volume of bus trips at time t

p(t) 		
		

represents the price of a bus ticket in a unit sale at time t,
t ∈[0,T]

E(M) 		

is the expectation of winning a prize M

a, b and c

are parameters; a must be negative and b be positive

The expectation of winning a prize, of the given incentives, is defined by
(2)

E(M)=
where:
Mj

expresses the prize of jth item of the rewards

f (Mj)

is the probability of winning the reward Mj , 0 ≤ f (Mj) ≤1

Profit Model for a Ticket Sales Agent
Based on the three premises above, the ticketing agent’s profit can be clarified. The
ticket agent’s profit is calculated as the sum of the net profit from selling tickets
and the bonus, with the cost of the prizes issued to lottery winners deducted
according to the promotional policy. Assume that the basic price of a ticket is C,
which the bus consortium (organized by the bus operators in Taipei city) contracts to the agent. The agent sells a unit ticket to a passenger with the price p(t).
Thus, the agent’s profit at time t is [p(t)-C] q(t), p(t)>C. Obtaining p(t) in Equation
(1), the profit can be derived as follows:
1
[p(t)-C] q(t) = [(q(t)
- bE(M) - c) - C]q(t)
(3)
a
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The gross gain from ticketing in period [0,T] is
1

∫0    [(q(t)
- bE(M) - c) - C]q(t)(1+i) dt
a
T

T-t

(4)

where:
denotes the interest rate

i		

In addition, supposing that the bus consortium sets the threshold for tickets sold
at level H for paying a bonus, and the agent gains the bonus B(·) if the tickets are
sold out to the amount of Q(T) in period T:

(5)

B(Q(T))

Equation (5) indicates that the agent’s bonus vanishes if ticket sales do not reach
the volume H. The agent will have a bonus of B(·) if the H volume is sold out. In
general, B(·) is designed as a linear function with a marginal bonus while the sold
quantity is beyond H. However, the expenditure of the agent for the lottery is

Σml =M L +M L

E(M)=

j

1

j

1

2

2

(6)

where:
Lj represents the quantity of the reward j
The first item (j=1) is the expenditure for the instant reward and the second item
(j=2) denotes the prize bestowed at the end of the given period of T. In considering the instant reward, the right-hand term in Equation (6) could be replaced by

∫0    [m1(t)l1(t)(1+i) dt + M2 L2
T

T-t

(7)

where:
m1(t)		

denotes the price of an instant reward

l1(t)		

represents the quantity of the instant reward

In brief, Equation (7) is used instead of the following form:

∫0   
T

(8)

57

Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2007

By incorporating Equations (4), (5), and (8), the total gain of the agent yields the
following:
G = ∫0   
T

(9)

With the maximum profit objective, the extreme value from Equation (9) is obtained:
G* = max ∫0   
T

(10)

While considering the agent’s attitude in referring to Equation (5), three possible
types of actions are dealt as follows:
1. The agent may discard obtaining the bonus if the threshold of the sold ticket
volume is too high to afford. The proposition is written as
(11)

2. For Type II, the agent decides that his task is to reach the threshold for getting a
bonus. He is not willing to put forth further sales effort due to the low margin for
a bonus. The proposition is written as
(12)
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3. For Type III, based on the bonus condition in Equation (5) issued by the bus
operators, the agent realizes that more profit can be earned by selling more tickets.
The proposition is as
(13)

Next, an attempt is made to identify the agent’s final decision from the above
three propositions. To do so, Equations (11), (12), and (13) must be solved with
respect to variable q(t). Since the propositions are dynamic problems depending on time t, the optimal control theory is applied (Chiang, 1992; Kamien and
· ·
and
Schwartz 1991). Let x=x(t)=q(t)
(14)
According to the Euler equation (Kamien and Schwartz 1991), to find the extreme
value from Equations (11), (12), and (13), the following function holds:
(15)
Substituting Equation (14) into the differential Equation (15) yields, at time t,
(16)
This is a general solution form. Different constraints in each type lead to different
results. Based on the constraint and boundary conditions in Type I, we obtain the
following result:
(17)
By integration,
(18)
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Substitute Equations (17) and (18) into (10) yields
(19)

as well as from Equation (1),
(20)
Similarly, for Type II, we have
(21)

(22)

(23)

(24)

For Type III, the bonus function, described in previous, could be replaced by
(25)
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and this implies
(26)
where:
x(tf ) denotes the total quantity of sales until the termination, tf = T
K

is the marginal bonus, the incentive for an extra sale

Consequently,
(27)

(28)

Then, we obtain the following result:
		
(29)

and corresponding to
(30)
The optimal action of the agent should be the most profitable one based on the
description of the three types under given conditions:
(31)
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Profit Model of Bus Operators
Bus operators are concerned with the profit they will earn so their goal is also
maximum profit. The bus operators’ profit function is comprised of the net revenue from their service, the amount of the bonus awarded to their agent, and the
governmental subsidy due to their contribution to traffic congestion relief. The
governmental subsidy is provided only if the total number of busloads during
the fiscal period surpasses the regulated threshold. Net revenue in service is the
income from the ticketing agent after deduction of the operating costs shared in
the processing of the electronic readers on buses.
^

While assuming that the operating cost shared in processing one ticket is f and
^
the net revenue per ticket is (C - f ), during the period [0,T ], the operators’ total
profit W is calculated by
(32)
in which, GP ( Nb ) represents the governmental subsidy:

where:
Nb

denotes the total number of loads carried by the bus operators
is the unit of subsidy with respect to a load

D

is the threshold for the subsidy

Both  and D are regulated by the government. Therefore, the object function of
the bus companies is set to be maximum profit as follows:
(33)
Since three types of agent attitudes have been described, the bus operators also
have three respected treatments. Substituting Equations (17) and (18), or (21) and
(22), or (27) and (28) into Equation (33) subsequently yields
(34)
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where:
k indicates the three types , k=1,2,3, respectively
As previous shown in Equation (25), the bonus can be expressed using the following general form:
B(Q(T)) = B(H) + K[Q(T) - H]

(35)

The bus operators’ profit can then be obtained
(36)
If the ticket agent has made his decision, the bus operators’ profit can clearly be
confirmed.

Calibration of the Demand Function
A case study is presented for bus operation in Taipei City, where the Taipei Bus
Consortium consists of eight bus companies. Passengers pay for bus fare with
a prepaid magnetic card. The prepaid ticket cards are sold through a wholesale
agent. The agent sells the prepaid ticket cards from ticketing windows distributed
throughout Taipei City in convenience stores. To understand the feasibility of
implementing the previous model in Taipei City, consumer opinions were investigated using a questionnaire survey. The survey focused largely on understanding
demand from and incentives to passengers. The questionnaire was designed to
allow travelers to easily state their preferences.
The contents of the questionnaire are: (1) vehicle ownership—motorcycle, passenger car; (2) trip purpose with transportation modal choice and frequencies in
the current run; (3) frequency change of riding the bus if the fare varies a ∆p; (4)
level of preferences if a lottery is involved in the bus ticketing; and (5) frequency
variations of riding the bus corresponding to different prize structures in a ticketing lottery game.
With a 5 percent level of significance in a random sampling of 1,320 Taipei citizens
from the phone directory, the statistical results show the following implications:
• The transportation mode distribution for Taipei citizens is one-fifth for buses,
and four-fifths for other modes such as motorcycles, passenger vehicles, and
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taxis. This indicates that approximately one-fifth of the citizens are classified
as captive bus passengers and four-fifths are noncaptive bus passengers.
• On average, the mean and standard deviation for bus use frequency for
captive bus passengers are 13.90 and 5.133 trips per week, respectively. The
mean and standard deviation for noncaptive bus passengers are 1.31 and
0.58 trips per week, respectively.
• Approximately 70 percent of all citizens consider purchasing promotional
tickets merged with a lottery game. Compared to the current one-fifth of the
population that travels by bus, the lottery promotion can enhance public
transportation ridership.
• For the original captive passengers, if the ticket fare increases a unit, they will
reduce their bus usage by an average of 1.16 trips per week. In the noncaptive group, if the ticket fare decreases a unit, these passengers may expand
their bus usage by an average of 0.35 trips per week.
• The likelihood of traveling by bus increases as the expectation of winning a
prize increases. The analysis of variance shows that with a 5 percent level of
significance with our promotional alternatives, there is nearly no difference
between captive and noncaptive passengers in terms of bus use frequency.
When the total reward ($5,000,000) is distributed over the structured pyramid proposed for alternative 1, the mean increase in bus use frequency is 6.39
trips per week and the standard deviation is 7.050. If the double incentive in
alternative 2 is used, the mean increase in bus use frequencies is 7.43 trips
per week. If the expectation value increases a unit, the increase in frequency
for all samples is 0.013 trips per week.
Based on the survey, the demand function is calibrated as follows:
For captive passengers
(37)

(* the t-value, ** the coefficient of determination, *** the F-value)
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For noncaptive bus passengers
(38)

For all samples
(39)

where:
∆qb

denotes the quantity variation corresponding to price variation
per trip for taking a bus

∆pb

represents the price variation per trip

∆E (M) is the expectation variation for winning a prize
Obviously, from Equations (37) and (38), in light of the price variation, captive
passengers are more sensitive than noncaptive passengers. Conversely, in considering expectation variation, noncaptive passengers are more sensitive than captive
passengers.
To understand the market tendency under the promotional strategy, the demand
function in terms of price and the expectation of winning a prize should be clarified. This demand function can be derived from the difference in Equation (39).
Next, Equation (39) is transformed into a step function
(40)
where:
a0 = -1.24
b0 = 0.454
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In considering the current mean frequencies for taking the bus transit by captive
and noncaptive bus passengers, 13.90 and 1.31 trips per week, weighting with onefifth of the total trips for captive and four-fifths for noncaptive, the population
mean frequency for taking the bus is estimated to be 3.828 trips per week. In Taipei
City, the current bus price is uniformly $15 per trip without promotion. Thus, the
boundary state values can be set as q0b = 3.828, p0b = 15, and E0 (M) = 0. By mathematical inductive method (Saber 1996), Equation (40) implies
qb(t) = -1.24pb(t) + 0.454E(M) + 22.428

(41)

Letting qb(t) be deducted qb0, the induced quantity for taking the bus at time t,
qb+(t), due to the promotion, is calculated as
qb+(t) = -1.24pb(t) + 0.454E(M) + 18.6

(42)

Furthermore, if the quantity is expressed by the number of prepaid ticket cards in
terms of card price and expectation value, Equation (42) yields
(43)
where:
N

denotes the number of trips paid using a card

In Taipei City, a ticket card with $600 can pay for 40 trips (independent of trip
distance). By doing so, the demand function is finally realized as follows:
qc+(t) = -7.75x10-4 pc(t) + 113.5x10-4 E(M) + 0.465

(44)

Equation (44) represents a person’s extra demand trend in unit of card quantity.

Market Analysis
The market effect is primarily evaluated in terms of the sensitivities and tendencies of the bus consortium and the ticketing agent, as well as efficiency in public
transportation. As stated in previous sections, obviously the government controls
the period length T, subsidy premium GP( Nb ), and threshold D for subsidy. The
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bus consortium determines basic ticket price C, operating cost f, bonus B(H),
threshold loads H for receiving bonus, and its margin K. Game bucks M1 and M2
distributed over the structured pyramid layer L1 and L2 are provided by the ticket
agent. These parameters definitely influence the variations in p*, Q*, G*, W*, and
Nb. These are clarified as follows:
• Governmental Policy and Domination. Assuming that the government
approves and supports the implementation strategy, how much GP(Nb),
D, and T should be initially announced by the promotional policy? In the
following case study, the periodic activity cycle is normally assumed to
encompass one year due to the fiscal system. Based on the records for the
past two years, the city government sponsored the city bus consortium with
$300 million annually and with total busloads averaging 650 million trips
annually. Therefore, the load subsidy is assumed to be about $0.5 per trip.
In a moderate case, the government can hopefully increase busloads by 36
million trips a year with the proposed incentive strategy. The threshold D
can then be set at 686 million loads (= 650 million + 36 million) for paying the extra subsidy. This means that if the annual busloads, Nb , exceed
the threshold of 686 million, the bus consortium can obtain an extra $0.5
subsidy per load, i.e. GP+ (Nb+ ) =0.5 Nb+ . Nb+ = Nb -650 million. Restated,
GP+ (Nb+ ) denotes the total extra subsidy based on the extra loads Nb+ over
the increased volume D’=36 million.
• Bus Consortium’s Proposition. According to the data from the Taipei City
Bus Consortium, their ticketing agent currently receives 4.063 percent of
revenue from the selling price. The basic price C issued from the consortium
is $575.62 per ticket card on account of the selling price of $600. Because the
government is to pay an extra subsidy at level of threshold D, the consortium
accordingly decides what threshold H’ of the extra cards sold for the bonus
provision proposed to the agent will maximize their own profit under the
consideration of slope K ($/card sold). H’ =(H-650 million)/40 in that each
card can pay for 40 trips. However, H’ must be equal to or larger than D’
/40, which is dominated by the government. Based on Equation (36), the
bonus is herein designated by B(Q(T)) = K · Q(T), if Q(T)>=H; otherwise,
^
B(Q(T)) = 0. f is counted at $0.76 per card for processing expenditures.
• Ticketing Agent’s Plan. In the case of a promotion for bus passengers, a reward
of $5 million is provided for the game. Of this total, $2 million is for instant
rewards uniformly distributed over the whole year, and $3 million is for the
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^

delayed prize, the final lottery reward. Referring to Equation (6)~(8), M2(t)
^
is estimated about $38,462 per week. M1(t) = $3 million.
• Others. Six percent is taken as a default for the annual interest rate in the following analysis. The expectation E(M) based on M1 and M2 and proportional
to the market volume is calculated iteratively and finalized by the amount
of ticket sold Q(T). Refer to Equation (2), f (Mj) = Lj /Q(T), for all j.
According to official estimates by Taipei, the market has 600,000 attendants.
Replacing the personal extra card demand qc+(t) with the market volume in Equation (44) and substituting into q(t) of the model described in section 2, the optimal
card price p*c , the total extra quantity of cards sold Q*c+(T), total extra gain of the
agent G*+, and total extra net revenue of the bus consortium W*+ will then be calculated for each type under previous parameters, consciousness, and assumptions.
Figure 2(a) illustrates the agent’s maximal extra gain curves G*+ with respect to the
threshold H’ under the condition of marginal bonus K=$6 per card sold. Figure
2(b), (c), and (d) display the relevant plots related to the optimal card price, total
extra profit for the bus consortium, and total extra quantity of passengers loaded
(Nb+ = 40 · Q*c+ (T)), respectively. According to Figure 2(a), the agent’s reaction is
obviously based on what H’ was provided by the consortium when calculating the
maximal gain from one of three actions: Types I, II, or III.
When the threshold of extra cards sold for receiving the bonus from the bus
consortium is less than 1.07 million (i.e., H’<1.07 million), the agent’s best action
is type III, selling more ticket cards earns him more money. If the threshold is provided between 1.07 million and 1.46 million, the best action is type II, in which the
agent’s policy is to sell the ticket cards just to hit the threshold. Otherwise, H’>1.46
million, the best action is type I, not having interest in the bonus provided. Therefore, the decision curve must be the bold envelope line—the linked line that each
segment meets along the shapes or tangents to the spheres—indicated in Figure
2(a). Under this circumstance, the corresponding curve in Figure 2(c) for the bus
consortium’s profit is also bold.
From the bus consortium’s perspective, however, the maximal profit point occurs
at H’=1.46 million and the agent’s action should be type II. Because H’=1.46 million is the turning point of an agent’s decision for type I or II, the bus consortium
should lower the threshold slightly from 1.46 million to ensure the agent’s locking
at type II. The final equilibrium point between the bus consortium and the agent
leads to the optimal ticket card price of $598 (Figure 2(b)), with total extra loads
being 58.4 million (Figure 2(d)). The extra profit for the bus consortium would be
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Figure 2. Solution of the Presented Case
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$885,299,000 (Figure 2(c)), which includes the subsidy of $29.2 million from the
government, supposing that the threshold of extra loads D’ for subsidy receipt is
announced at 36 million by the government. The maximal extra gain by the agent
at this equilibrium point is $37,707,100 (Figure 2(a)).
Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium results of the cases: D’=36 million, 54 million
and 72 million with respect to K= 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10. The table reveals that if the
government sets the load threshold at 36 million for bus consortium subsidization, the agent can easily achieve the target only via lottery strategy ( Nb+>36 million), despite any bus consortium bonus incentive, even K=0 (no incentive).
Table 1. Equilibrium Results of the Taipei Case in Presented Model
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Obviously, the agent will raise the ticket price to earn more profit if K is below $4.
If the government sets the load threshold at 54 million for bus consortium subsidization, the agent meets the target merely on the condition that K is greater than
$4. In addition, if the government sets the load threshold at 72 million, the agent
cannot achieve the target if K<=$10. However, the agent hopes that K is as large
as possible while the bus consortium prefers a lower D’. According to Table 1,
from the perspectives of the agent and bus consortium, D’=54 million through 36
million is acceptable. Meanwhile, K=$10 is the best solution for their profits, with
$37,828,400 extra gain for the agent and $975,819,000 for the consortium. Finally,
bus trips would be increased by about 64.8 million annually.

Conclusions
This article presented a novel promotion strategy for public transit, with particular
emphasis on strategy efficiency through an incentive system between passengers
and ticketing agents, ticket agents and bus operators, and bus operators and
the government. The mathematical model is formulated with a methodology of
optimal control description of the market for this incentive system. This model
focuses largely on maximizing the public transit market. Both the ticket agent and
bus companies receive their maximal profits in an equilibrium market. Results
obtained from this strategy can successfully enhance public transportation.
According to this study, a lottery game for bus passengers is very attractive to the
people in Taipei City. Although the captive bus passengers are sensitive to changes
in ticket price, both captive and noncaptive passengers reflect the same concerns
about rewarding expectations. With the analysis in a previous model, clearly the
proposed incentive strategy reveals the efficiency of traffic improvement. While
public transport patronage is gradually decreasing, this study’s considerations are
a useful contribution.

References
Chiang, A.C. 1992. Elements of dynamic optimization. New York: McGraw-Hill,
Inc.
Jiang, Y.-C. 1998. A rewarding system study for saving the bus transportation market. Master Thesis (in Chinese), Tamkang University, Taipei, Taiwan.

71

Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2007

Kamien, M. I., and N. L. Schwartz. 1991. Dynamic optimization, 2nd ed. Elsevier Science Publishing Co.
Lago, A. M., P. D. Mayworm, and J. M. Mcenroe. 1981. Transit service elasticity:
evidence from demonstrations and demand models. Journal of Transport
Economics and Policy 14: 99–119.
McConnell, C. R., and R. L. Brue. 1993. Economics—principles, problems, and policies. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.
Saber, N. E. 1996. An introduction to difference equations. New York: Springer-Verlag, Inc.

About the Authors
Tang-Hsien Chang (thchang@ntu.edu.tw) is a professor of civil engineering at
National Taiwan University. He received a B.S. degree in statistics from National
Cheng-Chi University, Taipei, and M.S. degree in civil engineering and Ph.D. degree
from National Taiwan University, Taipei.

Yih-Chiun Jiang (cyc626@ms41.hinet.net) is an operational engineer at Taipei
MRT company. He received an M.S. degree in transportation management from
Tamkang University, Taiwan.

72

